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A Neglected Stoic Argument for
Human Responsibility
DAVID E.HAHM
On two separate occasions Origen attempted to defend the proposition that
human beings are personally responsible for their actions. In his
comprehensive exposition of Christian theology, On Principles, written
about A.D. 220-25, he devoted an entire chapter to the subject of free will,
in the first half of which he attempted to demonstrate on philosophical
grounds that human beings are responsible for their behavior and that it is
within their power (to e<p' rmiv) to do right and avoid sin, as God in his
justice demands (De Princ. 3. 1.1-5 = SVF 2. 988).' A decade or so later
in his treatise On Prayer Origen again defended human responsibility, this
time in order to show that God does not foreordain everything that happens,
thereby rendering prayer useless, but rather that human beings remain in
control of and responsible for their own decisions and actions (De Orat. 6.
1-2 = SVF 2. 989).2
Origen's two arguments have long been regarded as influenced by the
Stoic literature in defense of moral responsibility, an issue that was being
hotiy debated in the philosophical schools in the second and third cenuiries
A.D.3 The first of these texts especially has been pressed into service for
^ The text of On Principles has been edited by Koetschau (1913) and reedited by
Gorgemanns and Karpp (1976). Page and line numbers in my citations are those of
Koetschau, which may also be found in the edition of Gorgemanns and Karpp. On the date,
see Butterworth vi-viii and Trigg 87.
I wish to acknowledge my debt to the Ohio State University for supporting my research
with a Faculty Professional Leave and a Seed Grant, and also to Corpus Christi College,
Cambridge, for electing me Visiting Fellow for 1990-91 and for providing a most pleasant
and stimulating environment in which to complete this paper.
^ The text of On Prayer is edited by Koetschau (1899). Page and line numbers in my
citations are those of Koetschau. On the date, see Jay 72, and Trigg 156.
' Von Amim -includes them in SVF 2. 988. 989 (all references to SVF are to fragment
numbers, with page and line numbers added in square brackets when needed); and they have
been used for the reconstruction of Stoic doctrine (see below, note 4). A Stoic influence on
Origen 's conception of human responsibility is also acknowledged in varying degrees by
Koch 280-91; Pohlenz I 426; Jackson, esp. 19-21; and Trigg 116-17; as weU as by the
authorities cited in note 4. The Stoic influence on Origen, in general, is surveyed by
Pohlenz I 423-28. U 203-07; and recent bibliography is cited by Inwood 281 n. 186. For
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the illumination that it sheds on the Stoic theory of action, as well as on
the Stoic defense of human responsibility in a world governed by fate.'*
Origen's second attempt to defend responsibility, however, has received
relatively little attention, either as an argument for the efficacy of prayer or
as a reflection of the controversy in secular philosophy.^ It is cited mainly
to fill in a few details that are absent from the discussion of On Principles.^
Yet even a superficial reading shows that though it begins in exactly the
same way as the argument in On Principles, it soon turns in a noticeably
different direction and eventually ranges over a series of points that are
entirely absent from the account of On Principles. The difference between
the two accounts raises the question why Origen did not simply repeat the
argument he had used in On Principles. He cannot have forgotten what he
had written earlier; the close resemblence of the first ten lines demonstrates
that he was fully aware of the way he had presented the argument in On
Principles. The version in On Prayer, then, must have been a deliberate
revision. As such, it constitutes a distinct contribution to the discussion of
the issue and needs to be analyzed and evaluated in its own right
One can best grasp the unique approach of Origen's argument in On
Prayer by comparing it to his earlier version in On Principles. There
Origen had attempted to show how rational human beings differ from other
things that move by locating them in a comprehensive division of
everything that moves:
Of things that move some have the cause of their motion in
themselves; others are moved only from outside. So the things that are
carried, like wood, stones, and every material held together only by its
physical state (e^iq), are moved only from outside. . . Plants and
animals, on the other hand, and basically everything that is held
together by nature (<p«oi^) or soul (v^xti), have the cause of moving in
themselves. . . And of those that have the cause of moving within
themselves, some, they claim, move out of themselves (e^ ea-uxociv)
Origen's relation to the Greek philosophical tradition as a whole, see the pioneering work
of Koch and, for a few examples of tlie recent tendency to emphasize Origen's Christian
transfonnation of Greek philosophy, see Balas, Dillon, and Kannengiesser.
* E.g.. by Gould 22; Stough 206. 220-21; Inwood 21-26. 78-82; and Long and Sedley
1313.
^ One of the most comprehensive treatments is by Gesell 156-60, who surveys the
argument and suggests a Neo-Platonic source, with only a brief allusion to the Neo-
Batonic triad of Being, Life, and Thought as a parallel for the three kinds of self-motion.
Typical of the treatment of the passage is Trigg 159-60 (cf. 116-17), who considers the
argument in On Prayer similar to that of On Principles, basically a Middle Platonic
approach. See also below, note 6.
^ Most frequently cited is Origen's claim in On Prayer that the characteristic activities
of plants, animals, and human beings (viz. growth, impulse, and reasoning) are named
motion "out of themselves" (e^ ea\)T0Jv). "from themselves" (owp' eavxmv), and "through
themselves" (6i' eavtcbv) respectively; cf.. e.g.. Stough 221 and n. 34; Inwood 22-24.
On the teiminology see below, notes 8 and 10.
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and others from themselves (a<p' eavxwv)—out of themselves the
things without soul (ay^vxa) [viz. plants] and from themselves the
ensouled things (e'liv^X")- fo'' ^^ ensouled things move when an
impression (cpavxaoia) calls forth an impulse (opjirj). . . The
rational animal, however, in addition to the impression-producing
nature also possesses reason (Xoyo^), which judges the impressions,
rejecting some and acepting others, in order that the living thing
(^mov) may be led in accord with them [viz. the approved
impressions]. {De Princ. 3. 1. 2 [196. 3-97. 11] = SVF 2. 988 [287.
33-88. 10])
After this Origen goes on in some detail regarding the acceptance or
rejection of impressions and finally concludes that it is precisely by virtue
of this function that rational animals may be said to be responsible for their
acuons (esp. De Princ. 3. 1. 3 [198. 5-11] = SVF 2. 988 [288. ll-22])P
The argument in On Prayer begins with exactly the same division:
Of things that move some have their mover outside, such as inanimate
things held together by physical disposition (e^h;) alone. (De Oral. 6.
1 [311. 16-17] = SVF 2. 989 [288. 37-38])
But instead of continuing the division of things that move in the manner of
On Principles, Origen immediately begins to shift to a different point of
view, namely, an enumeration of the different kinds of motion' thai
characterize the various categories of things that move. His point of view is
signaled from the beginning by the particles ^lev ... 5e ... 66; and the
shift from a division of things that move to an enumeration of kinds of
motion is further facilitated by the use of the ordinal numerals "second" and
"third" in his presentation of the subsequent items. The result is that while
the account begins with a division and a discussion of the first category of
things that move (viz. things moved from outside [xa ^ev Tiva to kivov)v
e'XEi e^coGev]), this discussion is presented as if it were a discussion of the
first member of a tripartite series, and the division is never mentioned again.
This procedure creates a tactical problem for Origen in his presentation
of the rest of the series. The original division separated off things moved
fi-om outside, but it left things that move from within as an undifferentiated
generic category, including both plants and animals. Origen's next move
ought to have been to subdivide this generic category in preparation for an
enumeration of its members and their motions. In his eagerness, however,
to shift over to ap enumeration of motions he overlooks this task and
instead says:
The second class (Sevtepa 5e) of things that move, in addition to
these [externally moved objects], are the things that move by the
agency of their internal nature or soul ({>nb xr^c, evvnapxovar\<;
q>\)OC(i)q r\ V'ux'n? Kivoiu|j.£va), which are also said to move "out of
^ For fuU discussion of this text and its relation to Stoicism see Inwood 21-26. 78-81.
26 Illinois Classical Studies, XVII. 1
them(selves)" (e^ avxwv) by those who are more scrupulous in
terminology (napa xoi(; icupitotepov xP^^M^^voiq xoiq 6v6|j.aoi). {De
Oral. 6. 1 [312. 1-3] = SVF 2. 989 [289. l-3])8
Here he denotes the second class of things that move by the still undivided
generic category ("things that move by either their internal nature or their
[internal] soul"), to which he then adds a relative clause identifying their
motion as "motion out of them(selves) (e^ avxwv)"—the motion that is
characteristic of things that move specifically by nature and not by soul.' In
this way he combines the enumeration of the second member of the series of
things Uiat move (although imprecisely described) with an identification of
its specific motion.
Finally, having given the proper technical name for the characteristic
motion of the second class, he ceases to enumerate the classes and
concentrates entirely on the motions themselves:
Third (xpixTi 5e) is the motion in animals which is named "the motion
from it(self)" (j\ otTi' at)xo\) kivtiok;); and I believe (oT|4.ai) that the
motion of rational beings is [called] "motion through them(selves)"
(5i' auxwv). {De Orat. 6. 1 [312. 3-5] = SVF 2. 989 [289. 3-6])
* I have retained the non-reflexive forms as found in the only extant MS of On Prayer,
even though the texts of On Principles and of SimpUcius In Cat. (= SVF 2. 499) use the
reflexive pronouns. The apparent inconsistency has tempted editors to emend the text of
On Prayer in some or all of the four instances of prepositional phrases. Koelschau
eventuaUy decided to emend aU four to bring them into line with the text of On Principles
(cf. Koetschau [1926] 27 n. 1). Such emendation is unnecessary and produces a
grammatically inferior text in three of the four instances. In SimpUcius and On Principles
the prepositional phrase modifies the verb and refers back to the subject of the sentence
(viz. the things that move). In On Prayer, however, in all but one case the prepositional
phrase qualifies a noun (lavTioiq) and the pronoun refers back to a genitive modifier; hence
it cannot be reflexive. In only one instance, where Origen is attempting to combine the
second class of things that move with the name of their motion, does the pronoun refer
back to the subject of the clause and the sentence, and hence only this one phrase might be
expected to contain a reflexive pronoun. Yet even here, if Origen had in mind a list of
motions in which the pronouns were non-reflexive (in keeping with standard grammatical
practice), he might have retained the non-reflexive form of his source despite a rephrasing
that called for a reflexive pronoun. One small additional point in favor of retaining the
non-reflexive forms of the manuscript is the fact that when Origen did use the reflexive
fonn in On Principles (De Princ. 3. 1. 2 [196. 11-97. 1] = SVF 2. 988 [287. 41-88. 2]). he
used the uncontracted form eauxcov, removing all ambiguity even in early, unaccented
uncial manuscripts. The fact that he uses the short form (avxou, a-utcov) in a discussion of
the very same subject in On Prayer may indicate that Origen did not intend the term to be
construed as a reflexive. It should be noted, moreover, that regardless of the form used in
the Greek text, which is determined by the exigencies of Greek grammar, the reference of
the pronoun is the same and the meaning is unaffected. Furthermore, in English the
reflexive is more indicative of the required meaning than the non-reflexive, even for the
nominal form, "motion out of itself."
' Contrast the clarity with which he distinguishes the second and third categories and
their motions in On Principles 3. 1. 2 (196. 11-97. 1) = SVF 2. 988 (287. 41-88. 1).
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Thus in three steps Origen shifts completely from a division of things that
move to an enumeration of the motions with which they move.
This procedure is surprising and suggests that Origen did not create this
argument from whole cloth, but constructed it by conflating two distinct
arguments. One of these, like the argument in On Principles, required a
classification of things that move on the basis of the source of their motion,
i.e., whether their motion originates from outside (as in inanimate things),
or from within (specifically from nature in plants, from soul in animals, and
from reason in human beings). The other account required a catalog or
enumeration of the kinds of motion that characterize the various classes of
things that move and designated at least the motions that arise from within
by different prepositions with a (reflexive) pronoun, i.e., e^ eavtoti, deep'
ea-uxov, or 5i' ea-oxov.^^ To meet these two requirements he grafted the
list of motions onto the initial division of things that move. The result
was a composite theoretical basis for his argument—a division of things
that move into things moved from outside and things that move from
within, but with the added stipulation that things that move from within
may possess as many as three different types of motion: (1) motion out of
themselves (presumably found in all living plants and animals), (2) motion
from themselves (animal motion), and (3) motion through themselves
(rational motion).
To confirm the hypothesis that Origen's argument is really a
combination of two separate arguments, we must examine how the
argument actually proceeds:
If we remove from the living creature (^©ov) motion from it(self) (dn'
av)XO\)), it can no longer be considered a living creature, but will be
either like a plant moving only by nature or like a stone carried
(q>epetai) by someone from outside. If it [the animal] is aware of its
own motion (jiapaKoX.o\)6fi "^11 '^^'^9- Kivrjoei), since it is to this that
we have given the name "moving through it(self)" (5i' av)xox)), this
[animal] will of necessity be rational. Those people, therefore, who
wish nothing to be subject to us (ecp' Tiniv) will necessarily arrive at a
most absurd conclusion: first, that we are not animals, and second, that
we are not rational, but we might [rather] say that what we believe we
[ourselves] are doing we [really] do, as it were, by the agency of an
external mover (oiov vnb e^coGev kivo\)V'co(;), in no way ourselves
doing the moving (aviol ovSa^cbq Kwo-unevoi). (De Oral. 6. 1-2
[312. 5-14] = SVF 2. 989 [288. 6-13])^^
For the sake of clarity and consistency I shall use the reflexive form for both the
English phrase and the corresponding Greek phrase, regardless whether the reference is to
the text of On Principles, which used the reflexive form, or to On Prayer, which probably
used the non-reflexive form (see above, note 8).
Unfortunately, all editions and translations begin a new paragraph in the middle at
De Oral. 6. 2 (312. 11) = SVF 2. 989 (289. 10). This breaks up the argument, which nins
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Though Origen's logic may not be immediately clear, it is obvious that he
is attempting to prove that determinism leads to not one, but two absurd
consequences: (1) we human beings are not living creatures (!C,S>a) and (2)
we human beings are not rational creatures (Ax)YiKd). Working backward
from this double conclusion, we see that it is preceded by two conditional
sentences. These may now be recognized as supplying the two required
major premises for the pair of conclusions, the first stipulating the
conditions that constitute denial of our status as animals, the second
stipulating the conditions for regarding an animal as rational. Origen's
argument thus takes the shape of two parallel syllogisms. In the one, he
argues that determinists by claiming that all our actions are done by the
agency of an external mover satisfy the condition of the first premise and
hence implicitly deny that we are living creatures. In the other, he argues
that determinists by this very same claim deny the condition that constitutes
rationality as specified in the second premise and therefore also deny that we
are rational creatures.
We shall have to clarify these arguments further; but first we must
observe that Origen's attack on the determinists consists of two parallel
arguments based on two parallel premises, and that one of these arguments
depends specifically on the distinction between motion caused by an external
mover and motion arising from within, whereas the other depends on a
particular concept of rational motion that Origen characterizes as "motion
through itself." Hence the course of the argument shows the same pattern
of conflation as did the exposition of what we may now construe as its
theoretical basis, the classification of things that move and their specific
motions. We may, therefore, use this pattern to disentangle the two
conflated arguments for further detailed analysis:
THEORETICAL BASIS
Division of Things that Move Catalog of Self-Motions
Of things that move some have
their mover outside, such as in-
animate things held together by
physical disposition alone, and
also things that are moved by
natiire and soul at times when
they are not being moved as
to De Oral. 6. 2 (312. 18) = SVF 2. 989 (288. 17). and has no doubt contributed to its
misunderstanding
.
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Division of Things that Move Catalog of Self-Motions
such [viz. by nature or soul], but
rather in the manner of things
held together only by physical
disposition. For stones that
have been extracted from a mine
and wood that has lost its capa-
city to grow, since these are
[now] held together only by
physical disposition, have their
mover outside. In fact, even the
bodies of animals and the foli-
age of plants when they are
transported (|ieTaxi9e|i.Eva) by
someone change place (|i.exa-
xiGeTtti) not as animals and
plants, but in the manner of
stones and wood that has lost
its capacity to grow. And
again, if ever these things move
by virtue of the fact that all
things disintegrate (pEvotct el-
vai) when they perish, they
have the motion that occurs
during perishing as an inciden-
tal result (7tapaKoXov6r|xiKT|v)
[viz. of the perishing, and thus
as an extemdly caused motion].
class of things that move, in
addition to these [externally
moved objects] are the things
that move by the agency of
their internal nature or soul.
The second
which are also said to move
"out of them(selves)" (e ^
avxmv) by those who are more
scrupulous in terminology.
Third is the motion in animals,
which is named "the motion
from it(self)" (t] an' avxov
kivhok;); and I believe that the
motion of rational beings is
[called] "motion through them
(selves)" (5i' ammv).
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ARGUMENTS
Based on
Division of Things that Move
If we remove from the living
creature motion from itself, it
can no longer be considered a
living creature, but will be
either like a plant moving only
by natiire or like a stone carried
by someone from outside.
Based on
Catalog of Self-Motions
If it [the animal] is aware of its
own motion (7tapaKoXo\)9fi
xfi i5ia Kivrioei), since it is
to this that we have given the
name "moving through itself,"
this [animal] will of necessity
be rational.
Those people, therefore, who wish nothing to be subject to us (£9*
fmiv) will necessarily arrive at a most absurd conclusion:
first, that we are not animals,
and second, that we are not
rational.
but we might say that what we believe we [ourselves] are doing we
[really] do,
as it were, by the agency of an
external mover (oiov •ujio e^co-
6ev Kivovvxoq),
in no way ourselves doing the
moving (avxoi ot)5ap.w5 ki-
vo-u^evoi). Esp>ecially after ex-
amining his own experience
let anyone see if he would not
be shameless to [still] claim
that he himself does not will,
he himself does not eat, he
himself does not walk, and,
moreover, he himself does not
assent and accept some beliefs,
and he himself does not reject
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others as false. {De Oral. 6. 1-
2 [311. 16-12. 18] = SVF 2.
989 [288. 37-89. 17])
We shall begin by examining the argument in the left-hand column, the
argument that we are not living creatures (C©a). This argument is based on
the premise:
K we remove from the living creature (^^ov) motion from it(self) (xfjv
dn' avTOv kivtiow), it can no longer be considered a living creature,
but will be either like a plant moving only by nature or like a stone
carried by someone from outside. (De Orat. 6. 1 [312. 5-8] = SVF 2.
989 [289. 5-7])
Origen laid the foundation for this premise in his presentation of the
division of things that move at the very beginning. In dividing things into
those moved from outside and those moving by nature or soul from within,
he made it clear that this division does not entail that things moving from
within are never moved from outside. ^^ Among the things moved from
outside he includes things that move by nature and soul (viz. plants and
animals) at those times when they are not moving qua plants or animals,
that is, with the proper motion of plants or animals {De Orat. 6. 1 [311.
17-24] = SVF 2. 989 [288. 37^4]). Plants, he believes, move as plants
when they grow (<pveiv, De Orat. 6. 1 [311. 19-20, 24-25] = SVF 2. 989
[288. 40-41, 43-44]); animals move as animals when they move by
impulse in response to an impression {De Princ. 3. 1. 2 [196. 13-97. 1] =
SVF 2. 988 [288. 1-2]). However, when a plant dies and loses its ability
to grow, as in the case of wood, or when plants or animals are transported
by someone or something, they are moved from outside in exactly the same
way as inanimate things {De Orat. 6. 1 [311. 19-24] = SVF 2. 989 [288.
40-44]). Thus plants and animals are subject to externally caused motion as
well as to their own proper internally caused motions.
In the actual statement of the premise Origen goes further and assumes
that the various classes of things that move by an internal source also
possess varying numbers of internally caused motions and that the number
of such motions depends on their position in the scale of things that move.
What he says is that if we take away (TiepieXxo^ev) the proper motion of an
animal, i.e., motion from itself, it will no longer qualify as an animal, but
will "move only by nature like a plant or be carried by someone from
outside like a stone" {De Orat. 6. 1 [312. 5-8] = SVF 2. 989 [289. 5-7]).
This implies that an animal is capable of three kinds of motion, externally
'^ In On Principles he adds the word fiovov to say: "Of things that move some have the
cause of their motion ui themselves, others are moved only from outside" (De Princ. 3. 1. 2
[196. 3-4] = SVF 2. 988 [287. 33-35]). This makes it clear that the other divisions are
moved externally as well as by one or more internal sources of motion.
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caused motion and two internally caused kinds of motion, motion by nature,
such as characterizes plants, and motion from itself, which is the proper
motion of animals; but it is only the motion from itself that defines the
animal. If this proper defining motion is removed, the animal may no
longer be considered an animal. It will still, however, be left with two
kinds of motion, the motion of biological growth that is the proper motion
of plants, and, of course, externally caused motion, which may happen to
anything at all, whether animate or inanimate. Origen's argument,
therefore, entails an analysis of things that move as an ordered series in
which each member possesses its own proper motion in addition to all the
motions of the prior members of the series.
This conception is built into the very structure of the division, which
we may abstract from the full account of it in On Principles. There we find
the first division defined as follows:
Of things that move some have the cause of their motion in
themselves; others are moved only from outside. (De Princ. 3. 1. 2
[196. 3^1 = SVF 2. 988 [287. 33-35])
This implies that things that have the cause of their motion in themselves
are also capable of being moved from outside, an implication that Origen
actually spelled out in On Prayer. Moreover, when Origen comes to the
last division, he says:
The rational animal in addition to the impression-producing nature also
possesses reason. {De Princ. 3. 1. 3 [197. 9-10] = SVF 2. 988 [288.
7-9])
He thereby reveals that on his analysis the internal source of motion which
characterizes a specific class of things that move occurs in addition to, not
in place of, the source that characterized the class from which it is being
differentiated. Thus the complete division may be diagrammed as follows: ^^
'^ I have enclosed "only" and "also" in parentheses where they do not occur in Origen's
text, but must be supplied to bring the division into line with the principle of division
used for the first and fourth classes. The bracketed descriptions indicate the implied
distribution of descriptions that Origen consolidates into a single generic description at
the prior level and does not explicitly repeat in the subdivisions of the genus. We might
note that this occurs in his attempt to differentiate plants from animals, where he prefers to
use the prepositional characterization of the catalog of motions.
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Division of Things That Move (On Principles 3. 1. 2-3)
Things that move
\
Moved only from
outside; held to-
gether by physical
disposition alone;
viz. inanimate
things
1
(Also) having a
cause of motion in
themselves; held
together (also) by
nature and soul; viz.
plants and aiiimals
Moving (only) out
of themselves;
[moving (only) by
internal nature; held
together (only) by
nature]; viz. soul-
less [plants]
I
Moving (also) from
themselves when
impression calls
forth impulse;
[moving (also) by
internal soul; held
together (also) by
soul]; viz. ensouled
[animals]
Moving (only) by
impression-produc-
ing nature and im-
pulse
Also possessing
reason, which judg-
es impressions
The structure of Origen's division is, in essence, an asymmetrical
dichotomy, in which each subdivision adds another source of motion and
another kind of motion as the defining characteristic of that class, thereby
assigning the four classes of things that move to an ordered series, each
member of which possesses the motions and sources of motion of all prior
members of the series in addition to its own proper motion and source of
motion. Specifically, the series consists of four members: (1) inanimate
things, (2) plants, (3) animals, and (4) rational creatures. The first member
of the series, inanimate things, move only from outside. Plants may also
be moved from outside, but their proper motion is one caused by their
internal nature and called "motion out of themselves." It is this motion that
occurs when they grow and flourish as plants. Animals, too, as the third
member of the series, have such motion by nature, enabling them to grow
and reproduce in the manner of plants, but their proper motion is the motion
from themselves (d(p* kavxSiv), which Origen in On Principles identifies
as the motion that arises when an impression calls forth an impulse (De
Princ. 3. 1. 2 [196. 13-97. 1] = SVF 2. 988 [288. 1-2]). Animals,
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therefore, are susceptible of three kinds of motion: (1) externally caused,
passive transportation, (2) biological growth (motion out of themselves),
and (3) motion by impulse (motion from themselves). Finally, human
beings conform to the same pattern. They possess these three forms of
motion, as well as a fourth, their own characteristic motion of reason,
which in On Prayer Origen calls "motion through themselves" (5i'
eavxwv).
It is this conception that forms the logical basis for Origen's first
argument in On Prayer. Leaving aside the specific motion of rational
creatures, he adopts the conception of an animal as possessing three
motions, externally caused transportation, biological growth, and motion by
impulse (motion from themselves). If we remove the proper motion of the
animal, the motion that defines it qua animal, it can no longer be regarded as
an animal. This, he asserts, is what the determinists do when they claim
that all human actions, even those that we believe we do on our own
initiative, are done "as it were, by the agency of something outside." For
this argument the motion of reason is not relevant; the determinist claim
that all human action is caused by an external mover denies even the animal
motion by impulse in response to an impression and so "removes motion
from itself." By leaving humans without the defining motion of animals,
the determinist position entails the absurd consequence that we human
beings are not even animals, much less rational animals.^"*
This analysis shows clearly the conceptual connections of the
argument. Formally the argument is made on die basis of the first step in
the division, viz. the division into things moved from without and things
that move themselves from within. The minor premise (that determinists
claim human beings are moved exclusively from outside) requires only the
distinction between things moved from within and things moved from
without. This distinction is fully developed in the opening lines of the
argument. The major premise, however, is formulated to reflect the full
range of superimposed motions to which an animal is subject:
If we remove from the living creature motion from itself, it can no
longer be considered a living creature, but will be either like a plant
moving only by nature or like a stone carried by someone from outside.
(De Orat. 6. 1 [312. 5-8] = SVF 2. 989 [289. 6-8])
^* The justice of Origen's criticism is a question that cannot be discussed here. Origen's
critique seems simply to oppose externally caused motion to motion by impulse without
taking any account of the possibility that a detenninist might incorporate animal motion
into his detenninist scheme by claiming that not only the impulse-provoking external
impression, but also the internal impulse-generating mechanism was in some way affected
by external causes. It may be that Origen says otov «Jt6 e^ojGev Kivouvroq, "as it were,
by an external mover," to include under this looser rubric accounts that determine the
internal mechanism. If so, he would seem to be claiming that such accounts give a human
being less freedom than an animal.
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Though these motions are expressed in terms of the prepositional
classification of the catalog, the catalog is not the theoretical ground for the
conception of a living creature as possessor of the three concomitant
motions. For concomitance, though not incompatible with the
classification by prepositions, is neither implied by that classification nor
stipulated as an additional condition in Origen's exposition. It is, on the
other hand, both a necessary, logical consequence of the asymmetrical
dichotomy of the division and explicitly mentioned in the full exposition of
that division in On Principles and again in the part repeated in On Prayer.
Thus we can safely say that the first argument against determinism is
derived conceptually from the division of things that move, such as is found
fully expressed in On Principles.
Yet at the same time we have to acknowledge that the conclusion of the
first argument in On Prayer is unequivocally different from that of the
argument of On Principles. In On Principles Origen made no attempt to
defend human responsibility on the basis of the internal origin of motion in
living creatures (t,&a), but staked his entire claim of human responsibility
on the capacity of the reason (X^oyoq) to resist the impulses provoked by
impressions of the senses (De Princ. 3. 1. 3 [197. 1-98. 11] = SVF 2. 988
[288. 2-22]). That argument is now replaced in On Prayer with a new
argument that even animals, and presumably some of the animal activities
of humans, arise frx)m within and so conflict with the determinist claim that
all movement without exception is caused from outside. ^^ This clears the
way for Origen to use the reason of rational creatures as the basis for a
second argument that is not based on the division of things that move.
Thus we can see that in constructing the composite argument in On Prayer,
Origen has carefully introduced part, but only part, of the division on which
his argument in On Principles was based, and then, on the basis of that part
and its assumptions about the structured distribution of motions among the
components of the universe, he has created a new argument, one which will
not interfere with the completely different argument with which he intends
to conflate it. Let us now turn to that second argument.
The second argument is presented in studied rhetorical antithesis to the
first within a conventional literary structure, a ring composition centered
around the conclusions:
'^ This does not mean that Origen is necessarily attributing full responsibility to
animals. In On Principles he cites spiders and bees as animals who create artistic,
geometrically shaped structures without possession of reason (De Princ. 3. 1. 2 [197. 2-9]
= SVF 2. 988 [288. 2-7]). The impression that calls forth such creations presumably
arises from within them and not entirely from some external source. Origen could uke
these animals as evidence that even irrational animals are not completely dependent on
external causes for all their motions. Yet, as he goes on to show in On Principles, they are
not morally responsible for their actions.
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Major Premise I
Major Premise 11
Conclusion I
Conclusion U
Minor Premise I
Minor Premise 11
Within this structure Origen expresses both arguments in the same
grammatical form. The major premises are introduced in the form of a pair
of conditional sentences (De Orat. 6. 1 [312. 5-10] = SVF 2. 989 [289. 5-
9]). Then the conclusion is expressed in the middle of the discussion in a
single sentence with the determinists* consequences in numbered, coordinate
indirect statements: first, that we are not living creatures, and second, that
we are not rational beings (De Orat. 6. 1 [312. 11-13] = SVF 2. 989 [289.
10-11]). Finally, the minor premises are added in the form of parallel
phrases in an indirect discourse statement of the determinists' allegations:
"moving, as it were, by an external mover, not by ourselves" {De Orat. 6. 2
[312. 13-14] = SVF 2. 989 [289. 12-13]). The parallel grammatical forms,
however, embody formally antithetical premises. Whereas the major
premise of the first argument draws a negative conclusion ("it is not an
animal") from a denial of the necessary defining characteristic, the major
premise of the second argument draws 2i positive conclusion ("it is rational")
firom the affirmation of the defining characteristic of this class. In the minor
premises the determinists are claimed to (rffirm a source of human motion
incompatible with the definition of animals, while simultaneously denying
the kind of motion that defines rational beings. Thus Origen claims that the
determinists satisfy the condition of the major premise in the first argument
and so affirm its negative conclusion, whereas they fail to satisfy the
condition of the major premise in the second and so deny its positive
conclusion. In the end the two antithetical syllogisms converge; the
affirmation of the negative conclusion of Major Premise I and the denial of
the positive conclusion of Major Premise II yield the two parallel negative
conclusions: We are not animals and we are not rational. This intricate
antithesis clearly reveals the care with which Origen constructed the
argument, as well as the importance he attached to the conflation of the two
arguments. It also indicates that the remodeling of the argument from On
Principles and the addition of the second argument was not a casual
variation, but a deliberate attempt to accentuate it by antithesis and to
produce a climactic focus on its central concept, namely, the rational motion
of human beings.
Origen 's second argument depends on the crucial claim that "being
aware of or "understanding" (TcapaKoXo-oGfj) one's own motion is the
proper motion or defining characteristic of rational human beings.^^ This
'* Most modem translators and interpretators, including Gesell 157-60 in his detailed
analysis of the passage, have missed this technical sense of napaKoXowSfi. which was
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claim he derives explicitly from the catalog of motions. In his statement of
the major premise he justifies the inference from awareness to rationality
with the explanation that it was such "awareness" to which he had given the
name "moving through oneself {De Orat. 6. 1 [312. 8-10] = SVF 2. 989
[288. 7-9]). He had not, of course, explicitly used the term in his catalog
of self-motions; but he is obviously claiming that "awareness" is the
particular motion that he had in mind when he said that the motion of
rational creatures is called "motion through oneself' (De Orat. 6. 1 [312. 5]
= SVF 2. 989 [288. 5-6]). Thus he intends us to see "understanding" as the
motion that specifically characterizes rational beings and differentiates them
from the living things (C&a) that move only by impulse "from
themselves" (d<p' eavxwv). Origen's argument, then, is that his definition
of rationality is grounded in the order of nature and can be used as
unimpeachable evidence of rationality.
His next step is to claim that the determinists deny that human beings
possess this characteristic. This he does by spelling out the implications of
the determinists' claim that he used for his first argument, i.e., that all
human action is caused by an external mover, as it were. If one follows the
determinists, one ought to say "that everything we think we do, we really
do, as it were, by an external cause, we ourselves in no way causing the
motion" (avxol o\)6a^©(; Kivov^ievoi, De Orat. 6. 2 [312. 13-14] = SVF
2. 989 [288. 12-13]). The argumentative significance of these last words is
clarified and emphasized by the subsequent sentence:
Let anyone examine his own experience and see if he would not be
shameless to continue to claim that he himself does not will (^f^ avxbq
OeXeiv), he himself does not eat, he himself does not walk, and,
moreover, he himself docs not assent and accept some beliefs, and he
himself does not reject others as false. (De Orat. 6. 2 [312. 14-18] =
SVF 2. 989 [288. 13-17])!''
Origen wants his readers to realize that the determinists by their claim that
all human actions are externally caused deny that we ourselves do any of
these things. Origen had just established that the unimpeachable mark of
rationality was "being aware of our own motion," which entails being able
to distinguish what is our own action from what is imposed on us from
without. The determinists, he now claims, effectively deny that we can do
that. They say that what we think we are doing by ourselves we are doing
under compulsion, as if by an outside agent, and that we are, in fact,
deceived and unable to recognize our own actions. By this claim they deny
napaKohyoQr[cu; and hence our rationality.
current in the second and third centuries A.D., wrongly interpreting the term simply as
"follows." This interpreution makes the argument unintelligible. Inwood 22 translates
correctly, but does not discuss the argument
*^ The sentence as a whole is given emphasis by the introductory words: aXXcoq te wxi.
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Origen's argument is now formally complete. Animals that are aware
of their own motions are rational. The determinists refuse to acknowledge
this awareness. Therefore, they ask us to believe that we are not rational.
But rhetorically Origen still holds his trump card. What the determinists
refuse to acknowledge is something that can be verified by intuitive
introspection. Anyone can examine his own experience and determine for
himself whether his action is freely chosen or not. By conceiving the
naturally ordained distinguishing feature of rational humanity as the ability
to recognize and reflect on one's own actions Origen gives everyone access
to irrefutable evidence of human freedom.^* This is no doubt why he can
call what the determinists ask us to believe "something extremely foolish"
(TiXieKoxaxov XI, De Oral. 6. 2 [312. 11-12] = SVF 2. 989 [289. 10]);
anyone can refute it by simple introspection.
This second argument in On Prayer is distinctly different from the
argument of On Principles. Its only explicit point of contact with On
Principles is the almost parenthetical remark there that the difference
between soulless self-movers (plants) and ensouled self-movers (animals) is
their kind of motion: The self-motion of plants is "out of themselves" (e^
eavTwv), whereas the self-motion of animals is "from themselves" (dcp'
eavTc5v,Dg Princ. 3. 1. 2 [196. 11-97. 1] = SVF 2. 988 [287. 41-88. 2]).
Thus we can hardly see the second argument as an extrapolation of the
argument of On Principles. We must look elsewhere for its conceptual
connections.
Our search quickly takes us back to the Stoa. Simplicius in his
commentary on Aristotle's Categories tells us that the Stoics differentiated
as "different kinds" (5ia<popa<; yevwv) (1) "moving out of oneself (e^
eavtou KivEiaGai), (2) "activating motion through oneself (5i' eavxot)
evepYEiv rnv kwtioiv), and (3) "acting from oneself (dcp' eavxot) noieiv,
SVF 2. 499). From this account the Stoic origin of the theoretical
foundation of Origen's second argument can readily be established.^'
Moreover, the conception of rational activity on which the entire
argument is based, namely, self-understanding (7iapaKoXov6T|ai<;), was
adopted by the Stoics in the second century A.D. as the essential
^' He picks up this point in his next argument, where he claims there are beliefs that
one cannot accept regardless of the number of persuasive arguments given in their favor
(De Oral. 6. 2 [312. 18-20] = SVF 2. 989 [289. 17-18]). If the determinists were right
that all human choices are determined by external causes, any belief presented with a
plausible argument would win assent. If some person can resist assent to even a single
belief, that rejection eo ipso constitutes an empirical refutation of the determinist claim.
Thus Origen has not only intuition, but objective empirical evidence in his support.
*' On this text and its relation to Origen see Inwood 23-24 and Long and Sedley n 310.
Simplicius' characterization of the three Stoic motions, however, does not agree with what
we read in Origen. This has led Inwood, followed by Long and Sedley, to suspect
contamination with Peripatetic and Neo-Platonic notions; but it is also possible to
explain the discrepancies as due to a misleading and selective abridgement of a longer
Stoic exposition. A full analysis of this text, however, is beyond the scope of this study.
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characteristic of rational human beings. Both Epictetus and Marcus
Aurelius used napaKoXo-dQr\a\.(; to denote the term for the capacity that
differentiates a rational human being from an animal.^° As such it had a
variety of connotations. In Epictetus these included understanding the
meaning of words, following the course of an argument, comprehending the
divine order that governs the universe and events in it, and, most relevantly,
understanding how to use external impressions so as to act morally in
harmony with the divine order and not merely to react mechanically as
animals do.^^ Thus it included not only evaluation of the impressions that
call forth action, but also evaluation of the evaluative process itself and of
the resulting actions in terms of their relation to the causal and moral order
of the universe. It was this second-order evaluation that constituted
awareness and understanding of the grounds of our own actions and that
formed the basis for the use of intuitive introspection in philosophical
investigation. Epictetus himself applied such introspection to the
recognition of one's own moral progress and so used it, for example, of a
student of philosophy who, he believed, should have been able to
"understand himself," specifically, that in learning philosophy he was
rejecting bad opinions and adopting new (scil. and better) ones, and was
thereby changing his position from one in which his choices were morally
indifferent to one in which he could make correct moral choices {Dis&. 3. 5.
4)22
But it is not only Epictetus' concept of TiapaKoXovGiiaiq as a mark of
rationality that parallels Origen's second argument; the role of intuition
entailed by that concept was also explicidy used by Epictetus as the basis
for his own proof of free will. Though, in general, Epictetus simply
assumed that human beings are capable of freely choosing their pursuits and
actions, on several occasions he offered an actual argument (Diss. 1. 17. 21-
28; 4. 1. 68-72, 99-100). His argument is strikingly similar to Origen's
second argument in both form and content, here quoted from Diss. 1. 17:^3
2° E.g.. Epict. Diss. 1. 6. 1-22, esp. 12-15; 1. 28. 19-20; 2. 10. 3 (cf. 2. 14. 14-17);
Marc. Ant 3. 1; 6. 42. Cf. Bonhoeffer 74-76; Long (1971) 189-92; Long (1982) 49-53.
^^ Understanding the meaning of words: Diss. 2. 14. 14-17; 2. 17. 6; following a
speech, argument, or demonstration: Diss. 1. 5. 5; 1. 7. 11. 33; 1. 14. 11; 1. 26. 13-14;
1. 29. 26; 2. 24. 13, 19; 3. 23. 26; comprehending the divine order: 1. 9. 4; 2. 10. 3. 4; 2.
16. 33; 4. 7. 7. and specifically the will of nature (PouXTijia xr\q (pvoecoq), 1. 17. 14-15
(cf. 18); 3. 20. 13; comprehending events (Yivojieva): 1. 6. 13; understanding the use of
impressions: 1. 6. 13, 17. 18 (cf. 21); 2. 6. 6. 8; 4. 7. 32; understanding the moral
impUcalions of actions: 1. 6. 15; 1. 28. 20; 2. 26. 3; 3. 5. 4-5 (cf. 3. 24. 110; 4. 7. 7);
recognizing one's actions as constituting resistance to the divine order: 3. 1. 29; 3. 10. 6
(cf. 3. 24. 1 10).
He also attributed to Socrates the sentiment that just as someone else derives joy
from improving his farm or his horse, he himself derives joy from being aware of himself
becoming better (napaKoXo-uGiov e^aux^ PeXtiovi "yivojievo), 3. 5. 14).
^^ Though the argument in both discourses is logically the same and verbally similar,
the context is different. In Diss. 4. 1. 68-75 it occurs in a dialogue on freedom and is
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Therefore, I go to this interpreter and diviner (e^TiyTitriv . . . Kai
GvTTiv) and say: "Examine the entrails for me and tell me what they
signify (oimaivexai) for me." He takes them and spreads them out and
then interprets as follows: "Oh, man, you have choice (jipoaipeaiv) by
nature without hindrance and constraint. This is what is written here in
the entrails. I will show this to you first in the area of assent. Can
anyone prevent you from approving truth? Indeed, no one can! Can
anyone force you to accept the false? Certainly not! Do you see that in
this area you have the capacity to choose free of hindrance, necessity,
and obstruction? What about the area of desire and impulse? Is that any
different? What can overpower an impulse except another impulse and
what can overpower desire or aversion except another desire or
aversion? Someone might object: *If someone threatens me with
death, he compels me.' No, not the threat; the fact that it seems better
to you to do that sort of thing rather than to die. So your own belief
(Soyna) has compelled you. That is, one choice has compelled the
other. For if God had so constituted (KaxeoKevotKei) that part which he
took from himself and gave to you in such a way that it could be
hindered or constrained either by himself or by someone else, he would
no longer be God, nor would he be caring for us as he ought. These are
the things I find in the sacrifice," he says. "These signs are given to
you. If you will (SeX-Tiq), you are free. If you will (QiTir^c,), you will
have no one to blame, no one to accuse. Everything will be in accord
with what is at the same time your will (yvoi\ir[v) and also God's."
(Diss. 1. 17. 21-28)
This argument was presented by Epictetus in an imaginative
metaphorical setting within a discourse (Diss. I. 17) devoted to the study of
the reason (^.oyoq). In this discourse Epictetus discussed the mental faculty
that is capable of undertaking such a study, its philosophical value, and
finally its goal or end.^'* At the very end of this discourse he depicts the
given as proof that his partner in the dialogue has something "on [his] own authority,
which is subject to him alone" (auTe^o-uoiov, o eni jiovco eoxi aoi,Diss. 4. 1. 68). In
Diss. 1. 17 it stands as the culmination of a discussion about reason (Xoyoc;), which, he
claims, yields the recognition that "you have a choice that is by nature free of hindrance
and constraint" (npoavpeoiv 'ixtic, aK(oX.\)xov (puoei Kal avavdyKaoxov, Diss. 1. 17.
29). Here it is claimed to be the outcome of an investigation of the reason, and is
presented in a striking mataphorical mode that clarifies its epistemological basis. Since
this shorter, but more suggestive, version reveals more clearly its similarity to Origen's
argument, it is this version that I shall quote and examine.
^ In Diss. 1. 17 Epictetus makes the following claims about reason, all in compressed
dialogue form: (1) the reason (Xoyoq) studies itself (1. 17. 1-3); (2) the study of reason
(Koyoq), typically called "logic" (XoYiKd), is important because reason is the agent of
understanding (eniaKETtxiKd, 8i' o\) xdXA,a KaxajiavGdvexai) and the standard of
judging (8iaKpixiKd, x6 xtov aXXoiv Kpixfipiov) everything else (1. 17. 4-12); (3) its
end in general terms is to understand the will or plan of nature (voiiaai, napaKoXou9eiv,
or KaxajiaGeiv x6 PdiXrina xx\q (puoecoq, 1. 17. 13-19); finally (4) the specific result of
this study is the recognition that "You have a choice that is by nature free of hindrance and
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concrete result of the study of the reason in the form of an elaborate
metaphor, in which the philosopher is portrayed as an interpreter and diviner
(E^TiynxTiv Kttl 6vTT|v), reading or interpreting God's will from the entrails
(oTiXdyxva) of a sacrificial victim. The organs used by the diviner
metaphorically represent the different psychological functions of the reason
that the philosopher qua diviner uses as empirical evidence for his
conclusions. So the philosopher looks first at the area of assent (etiI xov
ovyKaBeTiKov x6nox>) and then at the area of desire and impulse (etcI xov
opEicTiKov Kttl 6pfiT]TiKov). From these "organs" of the human mind he
"shows" (6£{4o)) the "prophecy" (^lavTElav): "You have a choice
(jcpoa{p£aiv) that is by nature free of hindrance and constraint. . . If you
will (BeXti^), you are free. You will have no one to blame, no one to
accuse."
This is clearly an argument for human freedom and responsibility, but
it is an argument that uses a metaphorical mode of presentation to lay its
theoretical foundation. Epictetus' metaphorical description of the process by
which the philosopher infers human freedom is that of a diviner reading
God's plan from the sacred offerings (ev toi(; l£poi(;), i.e., from the natural
condition of the human intellect.^ By this he makes it clear that he regards
the argument as drawing its conclusions directly from the divinely ordained
structure of the universe in accord with which human beings are endowed
with the unique capacity to choose their beliefs, desires, and impulses.^^
Even though this metaphorical proof of freedom makes no reference to these
psychic "motions" as members of a comprehensive, naturally ordered set of
self-motions, as Origen did in his argument, it appeals through its imagery
of divination to a divinely ordained, intellectuaUy comprehensible natural
structure as the basis for its validity.
But the similiarity to Origen's argument is found not only in its
theoretical basis. What is equally significant is the close similarity of its
logical structure and content. Epictetus looks for evidence of freedom first
in assent (ekI xox> croYKaBETiKoi) tokoi)) and in approving (inwevoai) the
true, while not accepting (napa5£^aa0ai) the false. Then he looks for
evidence of freedom in desire and impulse (ekI xo\> opEKxiKot) Kal
6p^T|TiKov). Finally, he describes both areas generically as "willing"
(QiXr[<;). Origen looks in precisely the same areas, but surveyed in reverse
constraint" {npoaiptaiv exEic, aKtoXutov qtwoei Koi avavdyKaotov, 1. 17. 20-29).
Cf. also 1. 1. 4 for another sutement of the conception of reason studying itself.
^ Epictetus calls the empirical evidence for the inference "holy things" (iepoiq, 1. 17.
28), a significantly ambiguous term. On the meuphorical level it denotes the pans of the
sacrificial victim, which by virtue of their dedication to God have become sacred. On the
philosophical level, it refers to the psychological functions of assent, desire, and impulse,
which in human beings become sacred by virtue of their service to the divine part of man,
the reason.
^ For Epictetus* conception of human reason as diviner, reading the signs in nature,
see Diss. 2. 7.
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order. He begins with the generic activity of willing (GeXevv), then
enumerates two examples of action resulting from impulse, scil. eating and
walking, and finally looks for evidence of freedom in assenting to
(avyicatatiGeaGai) and acccepting (Kapa5Exeo0ai) some doctrines,
while disapproving (dvaveveiv) others as false (De Oral. 6. 2 [312. 15-18]
= SVF 2. 989 [289. 14-17]). Significantly, even Origen's vocabulary
echoes the argument of Epictetus.
Finally, Epictetus finds the conclusive evidence for freedom of choice in
the presumably self-evident observation or intuition that there is no one
who can prevent a person from assenting to the truth or who can force him
to accept the false. He makes this point dramatically through the use of
rhetorical questions and emphatic answers. It also underlies his reply to the
objector who claims that a threat of death is an example of external
compulsion to perform some undesirable act. Epictetus' "diviner" rebuts
this objection, not by discursive argument, but by asking his opponent
simply to reflect: What can overcome a desire or aversion except another
desire or aversion? A threat of death is merely an occasion in which one is
confronted with two aversions: an aversion to dying and an aversion to
performing an undesirable act. As in any freely chosen act, action in these
circumstances arises from a decision or belief (86y\ia). From this intuitive
reflection on the process of assenting to beliefs and choosing actions,
Epictetus concludes that human choice is completely free and not even God
himself, who constituted human beings the way they are, can hinder or
compel human action. The similarities between Epictetus' argument and
Origen's are so strong as to leave little doubt that Origen derived the
essential features of his second argument from the same sources as those
from which Epictetus derived his own philosophy. Combined with the
testimony of Simplicius regarding the Stoic origin of the three prepositional
classifications of self-motion, these similiarities force us to conclude that
Origen's entire argument emanates from a Stoic source.
These parallels with Stoic doctrine bring into even sharper focus the
essential difference between Origen's two arguments and suggest a plausible
reason why Origen modified his lengthy and elaborate argument of On
Principles for his subsequent treatise On Prayer. Though in both works
Origen relies primarily on the rational capacity of human beings to justify
his claims of human freedom and responsibility, his conception of the
rational capacity differs significantly.^^ In On Principles the function of the
reason (Xoyoq) is to evaluate impressions ((pavtaaiai) and to decide
whether to assent to an impression or not. An assent results in an impulse
^ I say he relies primarily on the rational capacity because On Prayer also contains an
argument (which I have discussed above as the first argument) ihat does not make use of the
rational capacity, but links responsibility to the animal soul. In the overall strategy of
the argument, however, it plays a relatively minor role and could not, in itself, have been
the basis for Origen's revision.
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to action. The essential difference between an animal and a human being is
the fact that animals respond automatically and invariably to whatever
impression arises in accord with their particular nature. A human being,
however, does not respond automatically, but may choose to reject an
impression and so refrain from acting. It is in this capacity to resist an
impression that a person's moral responsibility lies. In On Prayer, in
contrast, the function of the reason (here called "awareness" or
"understanding" [TiapaKoXo-uGfi]) is to reflect on one's action; and it is this
ability to reflect on one's actions that enables a person to examine his
decisions and to recognize his independence and freedom from compulsion.
This difference in conception was, no doubt, a decisive factor in
Origen's choice of arguments for each context. When Origen defended free
will in On Principles, he did so for the express purpose of justifying God's
judgment of sinners. He could not do this without defending a sinner's
moral responsibility for his actions {De Princ. 3. 1. 1 [195. 4-96. 2], not in
SVF). The argument he brings in On Principles was admirably suited to
that purpose. There the defining characteristic of a human being was the
reason whose function is to evaluate every impression and to decide whether
to approve or reject it. This approval or rejection determines whether a
person will act upon an impression or not. The foundation of moral
responsibility in an ability to resist the lure of an impression made aa ideal
basis for justifying God's judgment of sinners, because it could be applied
directly to the avoidance of sin. In fact, one of the illustrations that Origen
used was that of a Christian monk confronted with an attractive woman {De
Princ. 3. 1. 4 [199. 1-11] = SVF 2. 988 [288. 26-35]). The impression of
the woman calls him to sinful action but, as a rational being, he is capable
of resisting this temptation and hence he is responsible for the consequences
of whatever decision he makes.
In On Prayer Origen was faced with a different challenge. He had to
defend the value of prayer against the charge that prayer is useless on the
grounds that all things happen by God's will and nothing that God
determines can be changed {De Oral. 5. 3-6).^ It was against this claim of
comprehensive divine predestination that Origen directed his anti-determinist
argument. In a defense of the value of prayer for affecting the course of
events the argument used in On Principles would have been of less value.
The ability to resist an impulse to inappropriate or immoral action may
have been sufficient to justify moral responsibility for actions, but it
possessed less efficacy for justifying a person's ability to determine his own
^ Origen also had to defend against the charge that God's foreknowledge makes prayer
unnecessary (6. 3-5). Against this charge he argues that God does indeed foreknow the
actions people will undertake by their free will, including their prayers; but he arranges the
consequences to correspond to their freely chosen actions, so that prayers are, in fact,
answered. The argument for free will thus serves as a foundation for his defense against
this charge as well.
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destiny through prayer. For that Origen needed to establish not merely
moral responsibility, but causal responsibility as well, and, what is more, a
causal responsibility that is not only reactive (able to block immoral
influences), but capable of initiating independent action as well.
The Stoic conception of napaKoXo\^i\ai<; did just that. For Epictetus,
it served, like the reason in Origen's On Principles, to evaluate individual
impressions that call forth action, but it also included the additional function
of understanding the process as a whole, as well as the entire woiking out of
divine providence in the universe (Diss. 1. 6. 12-22). Moreover, it included
reasoning out the implications of the divine order and bringing one's own
life into harmony with it (Diss. 1. 6. 12-22; 2. 8. 1-8; 2. 10. 1-6). This
ability not only differentiated humans from animals, but also set them over
the irrational animals as leaders (TipoTiyoviieva) or masters.^^ With their
understanding of the divine order and with their position as masters of all the
lower orders of nature, rational human beings are in a position, not merely
to comply with the order of nature, but even to take positive action to
promote it (cf., e.g.. Diss. 2. 10. 5-6). It is not hard to imagine why such
a conception of the human mind would have seemed to offer a better basis
for the kind of autonomy that Origen needed to oppose rigid divine
predestination and to justify the efficacy of prayer.
If, however, this broad conception of mind made a better basis for
justifying the efficacy of prayer than did the narrower conception of it as a
mechanism of accepting or rejecting impressions, we are still left with the
question why in On Prayer Origen did not completely ignore the argument
that he had used in On Principles. Why did he jeopardize the unity and
clarity of his presentation by conflating an argument based on the broad
conception of mind as awarenenss or understanding with the first phase of
the division that served to ground his argument in On Principles! Once
again the Stoic conception as exemplified in Epictetus suggests an
explanation. The conception of mind as 7iapaKoA,ot)0T|ai(;, which raises
human beings above animals and the rest of the component parts of the
universe and gives them an element of control over their destiny in the
universe, puts human beings on the same level as God. In fact, in the Stoic
view human beings carry a "fragment of God" (anocmaa^ia Beov) around
within themselves in the guise of their minds.^° This, as we have seen, was
Epictetus' primary basis for claiming that human choice is totally free and
unhindered (Diss. 1. 17. 27; cf. 1. 1. 10-12). If God had not constituted
human beings with total freedom from manipulation by himself or anyone
else, he would not be God or he would not be caring for us as he ought. In
^ The role as master is brought out in Epictetus' characterization of animals as servants
({)nr\ptxiKa, Diss. 2. 8. 6; 2. 10. 3). He also uses the verb oneteTaKTO of animals to
denote the correlate of npotiyovficva {Diss. 2. 8. 8).
'°E.g.. Diss. 1. 1. 10-12: 1. 14. 1-10; 1. 17. 27; 2. 8. 1-14; cf. 1. 9. 1-6. On this
Stoic doctrine see Bonhoeffer 76-80 and Rist 262-68.
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reality, Epictetus claimed, whatever human beings choose by will, will
actually occur in accord with a will that is their own and God's will at the
same time (Diss. 1. 17. 27-28). Human beings, in effect, participate with
God in the governance of the universe.
Such a close connection between human beings and God could not have
been unwelcome to Origen when he was attempting to justify the
possibility and importance of human communication with God through
prayer, but it did suggest at least one unacceptable consequence. If whatever
human beings will is actually in accord with God's will, then God is also in
some sense responsible for sin and wrongdoing in human beings. Origen
could not allow God to participate in human decisions to sin.^^ One way to
ensure this was to eliminate the Stoic conception of the human reason as a
"fragment of God" within. This Origen could do only at the risk of leaving
his argument bereft of its strongest basis for claiming human autonomy.
To compensate for this loss Origen built his second argument on the
ontological foundation of the first—the natural order of the universe. This
he could construe as the product of God's creative activity, thereby
grounding the existence and autonomy of the human mind, without making
God personally responsible for human action, specifically, human failures
and sins.
An analysis of Origen *s arguments for free will shows that OrigCQ was
familiar with a variety of Stoic arguments in support of human
responsibility. ^2 It also shows that he did not simply take over Stoic
arguments indiscriminately, but was sensitive to the philosophical nuances
of the arguments and selected from among them such as could support his
^^Jn On Prayer Origen deals with this problem in connection with the petition of the
Lord's Prayer, "Lead us not into temptaticm" (De Oral. 19. 11). He resolves it by appealing
to free will {De Oral. 19. 13). For an account of Origen's own conception of the mind and
its relation to God, its creator, see Crouzel 36-50, esp. 47, and O'Laughlin. Cf.
Butterworth xxxiii and Jay 66-67.
^^ Whether he knew them directly from Stoic sources or received them through Middle
or Neo-Platonic sources is difficult to ascertain. Origen certainly had read Chrysippus
(e.g., C. Cels. 1. 64, 2. 12, 4. 48. 4. 63, 5. 57, 8. 51) and other early Stoics and knew of
and admired Epictetus (e.g., C. Cels. 3. 54, 6. 2, 7. 53); see also Chadwick; Jackson 20;
and Inwood 281 n. 186. The division of things that move, however, is attested only in
Origen's proof in On Principles and in a differently structured version in Clement of
Alexandria (Strom. 2. 20 = SVF 2. 714). Another related division, but of things that are.
rather than of things that move, is found in PhUo of Alexandria (Quis rer. div. her. 137-
39) and in Seneca {Ep. 58. 14). The preponderance of references to the division in
Alexandrian Jewish and Christian writers could suggest transmission via Alexandrian
Platonism. Similarly the fact that the prepositional classification of self-motions is
otherwise attested only in the Neo-Platonist Simplicius, and that in the context of a
discussion of Neo-Platonic conceptions of motion, points in the same direction; but we
must also consider that neither Origen's division nor his catalog is parallelled exactly by
any other text. At the very least, we have to assume a fluid tradition in which these
conceptions were transmitted; and the possibility of direct influence of Stoic texts at
different stages must be kept open.
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own theological objectives most effectively without importing any
conceptions incompatible with his theological presuppositions. In the case
of On Prayer this meant adapting and combining elements from two
different arguments to create a rhetorically effective double argument in
support of human autonomy and freedom. Origen thereby proved himself to
have been a philosophically astute, creative adapter of Stoic philosophy to
Christian theology.
At the same time an analysis of his adaptation of Stoic arguments
discloses at least one argument, based on a prepositional classification of
motions and a self-reflective conception of mind, that is distinctly different
from the Stoic arguments for human responsibility attested by Cicero,
Aulus Gellius, and Alexander of Aphrodisias.^^ This argument sheds new
light on the Stoic treatment of the issue of human responsibility. Its
appearance in the repertory of Stoic arguments suggests that the Stoics did
not limit themselves to the approach established by Chrysippus, but went
beyond him to explore new ways of attacking the problem. If that is the
case, the history of the Stoic treatment of this important philosophical topic
and the role of the Stoa in the larger history of die subject may have to be
reexamined
The Ohio State University
'' These arc conveniently collected in SVF 2. 974-1007 and in Long and Sedley I 386-
91; n 382-88. For a discussion of Chrysippus' defense of human responsibility and the
general Stoic treatment of the subject see Long (1971), van Straaten, Long and Sedley I
333-55, 386-94. with further bibliography at 11 505.
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